5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

773 574 345 554 demigods who are believed to have stablished the institution of building a feast house. As this couple were in the feast house during the fight, it may be assumed that they were, in a ritual sense, the feast-givers. A modern feast also always has a person occupying the office of feast leader who is charged with the ritual as well as the organisational tasks of the feast. This leader (*pondo kiari embo*) is a man acting alone, and there is no mention that his wife has any function. This is a curious discrepancy between myth and custom, especially as elsewhere in New Guinea the feast-givers are often an elderly couple (e.g. Landtman 1927).

773 574 787 I was told that the people of Hamburata, before holding a feast, always consult the stone mentioned in this tale. When the wind blows through it, it makes a whistling sound, and is the sign that a feast may be held. This may be regarded as part of the ritual precautions necessary to ensure that a feast will be successful, but it is a purely local custom. The rule that a feast may not be held in hungry times is quoted and observed by all Orokaiva informants, of whatever locality. For the purpose of my analysis it is more important than the rule concerning the stone.

773 574 This tale resembles the one previously quoted in that both are concerned with a quarrel (*isoro*). The affair at the feast was not just an ebullient sham fight (*embogo*), but a serious battle, as the term *isoro* implies. But the messages of the two myths differ, in fact they seem to contradict each other. The message of the feasting myth may be summed up as follows:

1. In original time, men might hold some kind of feast at any time, but since the days of Jomiko and Sirere such permanent amity was no longer permitted. The *isoro* ended it.
2. Feasting was henceforth permitted only after special precautions had been taken and special permission obtained from the demigod. It had become an exceptional event, for which a special feast house had to be built.
3. The main criterion for the appropriateness of a feast was abundance of food.
4. A feast could be permitted only if perfect peace reigned among the guests. If the guests quarrelled the demigod's spirit would at once depart and the feast would be ritually void or even calamitous.

773 574 728 While the *isoro* was mentioned in the myth of the stolen lashing leads to a permanent state of war, the *isoro* in the feasting myth leads only to a restriction on the occasions when feasts may properly be held, and a rule to keep the peace for the feast's duration. How can these two apparently discrepant ideas about the nature of *isoro* be reconciled? My Orokaiva informants considered the two myths as stating different aspects of the same principle. Certainly *isoro* is (or used to be, before the Australians came) an expression of mutual anger that will never end. But it may be briefly interrupted, and it is good that from time to time the anger should cease and that men should then come together for a common feast.

Williams describes these interruptions exremely well:

> The lively monotony of warfare was broken by intervals of peace. A truce-making was called *peka*, and the first emissaries were women who, born members of one tribe, had married into or been captured by the

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

> other... Two or three from either side would spend a few days and nights with the opposite party, and after this the two tribes would meet in armed force on some common ground between their territories to exchange gifts of pigs and ornaments.... (1930: 166)

Williams emphasises that such *peka* were precarious and often mere stratagems for killing more enemies. Nonetheless, feasts were held at intervals, former enemies were invited to them, and when they did happen the slate of old hostilities was wiped clean. No doubt, hostilities of the same kind would often occur again once the feast was over. Nonetheless, if there was no treachery, the feast was an occasion when the estrangement existing between social groups could be overcome in a communion ritual in which primeval amity was restored.

The notion of the feast as communion ritual is most clearly stated in a series of myths, of which the most widely known is that of Totoima. Some of the most celebrated stories about Totoima – his practice of killing men and eating them while wearing pig's tusks, and of killing and eating his children as soon as they were born – are reserved for other chapters of this work. All the stories about Totoima, however, have a similar ending: by some trick (his son stealing his teeth, his son feigning death and concealing a spear, his wife or sister raising many children out of blood from a cut finger so they could murder him) Totoima was killed in revenge for his iniquities. In many of the versions, which we shall discuss in Chapter VII, Totoima is neither fully a human being nor fully a wild pig but rather an undifferentiated pig-man partaking of the nature of both.

Totoima's body was cut into the joints into which pigs (and presumably slain humans) were traditionally subdivided prior to being shared out between guests at a feast. Those who ate the joints multiplied miraculously so that their descendants peopled practically the whole of the Northern District. Usually, at a feast, the joints would be given to the heads of different nuclear or extended families. In this case, the family head who received the right fore-leg became the ancestor of all the Mambare people; the recipient of the left fore-leg became the ancestor of the Opi people; the right hind-leg became Sangara, the left hind-leg Isivita, the head became the coastal people, the back Kokoda, the belly Togahou and the 'liver' Angerita. One might say therefore that Totoima was the primal ancestor of all these warring tribes, and as Williams shows (mostly in his unpublished manuscripts) all the tribes listed here have retained some similar story.

But Totoima was a primal ancestor in a special sense. Strictly, in most of the versions, he was not the sire of the people who ate his meat. He is not, therefore, an ancestor in a genealogical sense. But it was his meat that miraculously caused these small families to multiply into tribes. Thus it was his strength, his *ivo*, entering the bodies of those who ate him, which really caused the tribes to multiply. The tribesmen became the inheritors of his *ivo* and it was from this that their power arose. Totoima was their ancestor in the sense that they had his *ivo*. We are thus led closer to the underlying pattern of Orokaiva political philosophy. As a result of the primal quarrel, the affair of the stolen lashing, social groups were separated by a permanent *isoro*. At the same time they are bound together by a primeval communion, the common eating of

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

829 571 574 [243] [789] This model is very similar to the exchange cycle in which meat is served as the mediating element. I have already pointed out that taro, displayed on a huge and impressive platform, is an essential part of the gifts offered at a feast. I did not then quote the folk explanation of this. I was told that harvest feasts are beneficial to the donors because feasts make the taro grow well. On further enquiry I found that the Orokaiva believe that taro *always* grows well except if sorcerers from other villages put a spell on it. One of the rituals at a feast is a kind of rain-making ritual performed by medicine men from among the *guests*. When I asked: 'Why the guests?', I was told that they would be expert at removing the bad magic from the gardens because, in all probability, it was they who put it there! We can now see why it is that the guests' forgiveness, in the model, leads directly to a magical increase of taro. I was also told that the increase in the taro harvest would enable the hosts to give another feast soon afterwards. As this second feast would normally not be given to the same group as the first, the idea suggested by the model is that successful feasts enable a village to give an infinite series of feasts, thus attracting an infinite number of allies, one after the other, and becoming infinitely powerful.

574 182 [243] [789] [728] In reality, however, this infinite series is interrupted by disappointing harvests and other misfortunes. Such misfortunes are ascribed to the sorcery of enemies, and in order to remove this sorcery, a *peka* is made with the enemies. A feast is held; and it is thought that matters will again improve. There is a periodicity of shortage and abundance, coinciding with the quality of external relations. Prior to the *pax Australiana*, bad external relations caused frequent warfare, the marauding of gardens or the lack of attention to gardens. Feasts had to be held occasionally so that the intensity of warfare would not lead to a serious depletion of food stocks. Feasts thus produced an abundance of food, because they provided peace, or at least a respite from war. The institution of feasting kept the scale of warfare down to a level which the people could economically afford. This ecological basis of the cyclical movement between war and peace is well documented in Rappaport's book about the Tsembaga (1968).

574 243 In terms of the model developed in this chapter we may express this cyclical process as follows:

MODEL 4



This exchange cycle belongs to the level of ecology rather than of social relations. The exchange partners in the model are man and his garden. The objects of exchange are the man's extra labour, needed to make a feast garden, and the abundance of taro that his garden can provide in good seasons. But it will not do so merely in response to man's labour. Labour alone cannot

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

household to other households with which the bonds were intimate. Their function was to maintain existing social relationships. Nobody maintained relations of this sort with every household in the village; in the twenty-eight days for which I kept tally, the number of partnerships of individual households varied from three to fourteen out of a total of twenty-two households surveyed. This means that the households with the smallest networks had only three exchange partners during the survey period, out of a possible total of twenty-one, and the households with the largest network still failed to exchange with seven of the available households. The average number of exchange partners for the sample was 8.5. If the survey period had been longer, no doubt this average would have been higher, but even when critical events occurred (there was one death and one important visitor in the survey period) food contributions were not sent by *all* households, nor even by all households belonging to the same clan. Each household had its own private network, partly determined by close consanguineal and affinal ties but partly also by idiosyncratic considerations.

Taro gifts made to establish new relationships were of a different kind. In speaking of a 'new' relationship, I do not mean only those cases where gifts were made to persons hitherto unknown. Such cases were rare indeed. It may be justified, however, to speak of 'new' relationships when the nature of a relationship was changed dramatically, made significantly more intimate, as the result of a ceremony where gifts were made. Such a change would occur when one village invited another to a feast, thus terminating old hostilities and placing the relationship on a new footing. Similarly, a dramatic change in relationship would occur as the result of a wedding ceremony when two kinship groups, whatever their previous relation, would begin to regard each other as affines. On a smaller scale, some relationships are intimate only at the time of actual contact. An example would be guest friendships and trading partnerships. Here the intimacy has to be re-established on every one of the infrequent occasions when one partner visits the other. Even if there has been no conflict whatever, Orokaiva always ritually assume that a long-absent friend has become a stranger and the relationship must be restored. As far as I know, Orokaiva do not carry this notion as far as the Maori, who greet a long-absent friend as though they were still heavily in mourning for his death.

Taro is always given by the hosts when such a 'new' relationship is established. But in such cases the taro is uncooked, and still has the top attached to it. I was told that taro, in that form, still contained a spirit and was 'alive'. The ceremonial way of giving such taro is in the form of a pyramid-like mound, the tubers facing outwards, the tops facing inwards. On the top of the mound, a few taro are placed with the tops facing upwards. The mounds should be built on a *gaga*. It will be noticed that the position of the taro on the *gaga* is precisely the same as the position in which Totoima's son lay ('with his chest turned upwards') when his father attacked him.

If we compare this type of gift with the type considered previously, we notice several reversals of the symbolism:

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

574 782 431 437 [572] successfully cultivated that land, and at the same time no doubt with *dema* figures who instituted agriculture. But most sacrifices have to do with social relations that are either being entered into or that are being restored after a period of hostility. In all such cases the sacrificed pig serves as a gift object to the persons whose friendship is being sought. These persons may be clansmen, uterine kin, affines, bond-friends, trading partners, or persons who have rendered important ritual services.

578 431 571 825 [824] An exhaustive list of examples of such sacrifices, very often involving only one pig and a rather minor ceremony, cannot be given. If a person has broken off social relations with a close relative in anger, by showing this relative his plant emblem, then relations can be restored only if the angry man is persuaded to 'throw his plant emblem away'. If he does this, the person to whom the plant emblem has been shown will sacrifice a pig. Again, if a man feels that he has neglected a fellow clansman for an unduly long time, he will end the estrangement by offering up a pig. A pig may be sacrificed to mark any reconciliation after a quarrel. The sacrificer in such a case appears to admit his [754] own guilt and to restore a wrong done to the other person. Very often such a reconciliation follows a misfortune attributed to sorcery. The medicine man will determine, if the sufferer does not already know, who has caused the sorcery to be performed. It is then considered highly important to arrange a reconciliation with the person responsible for the sorcery. This person is not infrequently a close relative, such as a father's sister or mother's sister. The sufferer will offer up a pig if the dangerous relative is willing to forgive and forget. Sacrifices are also required when a person has violated a taboo, e.g. quarrelled in the presence of a cross-cousin or affine. In all such cases a feast will be held at which the wronged person receives the sacrificial beast.

The same pattern may be found in the larger ceremonies. I shall show in a later chapter that the various prestations rendered between affines can be viewed as propitiatory gifts made to allay anger at the wrong done by the other party. This is certainly true for the gifts made on various occasions by the husband, the husband's sister, etc. to the wife's relatives. Feasts given on the occasion of peace-making, or on other occasions where whole villages are invited can likewise be shown to have as their prime purpose the ending of strife. In all such cases the sacrifice of pigs is preliminary to their utilisation for the mediation of social exchange.

628 728 574

This pattern does not appear quite consistent with the communion model of sacrifice. Not only is there no rule that the offerers of the sacrifice should eat of the victim; on the contrary, we shall see that they are strictly forbidden to eat of it. The guests carry all the meat away with them and distribute it among their own group. One almost feels that the expiatory model might be applicable: the offerers of the sacrifice define themselves as offenders, they expiate their wrong-doing by sacrifice, the flesh of the victim becomes taboo to them.

782 571 574 431 The contradiction disappears if we regard communion with the god not purely as the ultimate end of sacrifice but also (and simultaneously) as the means to the mediation of a social relationship. I am suggesting that the Orokaiva believe that the killing and offering of a pig is not *in itself* sufficient to initiate or restore a social relationship: it is also necessary to make the offering in a properly ritual manner. The ritual involves the establishment of communion

The evidence presented in the previous section shows that we are in fact concerned not with one exchange cycle (i.e. model 25) but with two. The second cycle represents the exchange of sanctions which preceded the feast. Though our data with regard to both the Togahou-Sivepe and the Sangara-Koipa (Isivita) wars are rather fragmentary, we do know that there were a number of raids, the last of which are still known to informants today and date back no more than 60 years. Each side is reported to have raided the other; there were killings; there was cannibalism; women were abducted. Sangara admits having abducted Isivita women but denies that any of its own women were abducted; abductions between Sivepe and Togahou can be shown to have been mutual. The last killings were too long ago for me to be sure which side had made the last raid and which side had, in the finish, a favourable tally of killings. Sivepe and Hohorita both claimed to have come out on the winning side, but I had no opportunity to check the evidence with Togahou and Isivita. If we accept the Sivepe and Hohorita versions, both these villages were in the unpleasant position of having enemies who were still seeking revenge.

Due to the restraints of the *pax Australiana*, this revenge could not take the form of an armed raid, but sorcery was still a possible form of relaliation, as the Australian authorities could not easily detect this. Both Sivepe and Hohorita might therefore justifiably fear sorcery from their old enemies, supposing they wanted to even the scores. There is no evidence, to my knowledge, that either Togahou or Koipa had such ideas in mind, but whenever misfortunes happened to Sivepe people in Togahou, or to gardens in Hohorita, the thought of sorcery used by old enemies seemed reasonable to the Orokaiva. We may represent the exchange of sanctions, prior to the feasts, in the following diagram:

MODEL 26



In order to account for pig sacrifice, we require both model 25 (showing the social exchange achieved by the feast) and model 26 (showing the circumstances which made Hohorita into an 'offender' and Koipa into an 'offended' party). In addition, we need to explain why the groups involved decided to adopt new objects of exchange in their social relationship. Until recently, the two sides exchanged enmity which they mediated by various penalties such as raids and sorcery. At the time of the feast, however, we find the same two parties exchanging expiation and forgiveness. It is possible to invoke a number of historical contingencies to explain this change. Informants liked to tell me that the change was due to the effect of the *iji eha*: the fact that everybody was baptised and moving into a new age when old enmities should be forgotten. I

A,B [See Category 574, p. 148--Analyst]

5: Schwimmer E-4,5 (1966-1967) 1973
OJ23 Orokaiva OJ23
Mountain Orokaiva

574 could not help noticing the connection between the reconciliation and the
628 simultaneous fear of sorcery to which I have already referred. But perhaps
721 neither historical explanation is necessary.
728 It seems clear from Williams' evidence and from the little I could reconstruct in 1966 that Orokaiva history had been one long sequence of hostilities and reconciliations. The reasons for the reconciliations were various: the legalising of marriages after abductions, the expediency of forming alliances with old enemies when faced with the threat of new enemies, a desire for peace after some Pyrrhic victories, and so on. On the level of myth we find the same message: the permanent state of *isoro* was interrupted by periodic feasts (see model 1). The series starts, according to myth, with a state of primordial peace. This is followed by *isoro, peka, isoro* in permanent alternation. We may represent the total pattern by the series of congruent ellipses drawn on parallel planes directly above one another (see Model 27).

I have presented transactions in historical time by a series of four transactions, the first and last of which are purely exchanges of penalties. Cycle 2 represents an agreement between two opponents to cease warfare and make peace (*peka*). This cycle would normally start with a message, sent by the original aggressor, that he is ready to make amends. This message would be followed by a visit from the other party to the aggressor, when the latter would promise to hold a feast. A customary practice at such a meeting was for the aggressor to plant a cordiline (*poponda*) in evidence of this promise. The aggressor would then arrange a pig sacrifice.

Cycle 3 would be marked by peace (*peka*). The victim of the original aggression would give a return feast which was probably obligatory. If the basic end of pig sacrifice were communion or expiation, no return feast would be necessary, but as we have found the basic end to be the establishment or restoration of social relations, on a basis of equality, there must be a balance of prestations. Each side must sacrifice pigs; each side must dance for the other; each side must dispel black magic from the gardens of the other. Each side must expiate past offences and each side must extend forgiveness. But the model shows that such reconciliation is not expected to be more than temporary although, of course, friendship between villages can sometimes be maintained for protracted periods and there is no rule against holding feasts before a quarrel has reached deadly proportions.

571 The model applies not only to inter-village relations but to all social relations
602 in general, consanguineal and affinal relations included. Quarrels between
578 consanguines differ only in their relatively greater reluctance to resort to an exchange of penalties and greater readiness to settle a quarrel before it has gone
754 too far. But here a great deal is said to depend on the type of kin relationship holding between the quarrelling parties. A father or mother will rarely use sorcery or other harmful measures against his or her children. Certainly they will not do so until they have, in the course of the quarrel, broken off social relations by showing their plant emblem. Usually a quarrel does not go beyond the breaking off of relations, but if further unpleasantness should occur and if the person who has caused anger is experiencing some misfortune, sorcery will at once be suspected. The same is true in case of conflict with the father's or the mother's brother, though the showing of the plant emblem does not, in such

A [See Category 574, p. 58--Analyst]

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 158]

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MODEL 27



628 There were ordinarily no persons who could command the
701 allegiance of the tribe as a whole, nor was there any status with
authority to effect the settlement of disputes between different
166 subgroups or their individual members. Sometimes persistent
intratribal conflicts led to short-term migration or to a splinter-
group's secession from the tribe. However, these disturbances
were very minor in comparison with the 'flight, dispersal and
migration' in general resulting from incessant intertribal[1] feuds
(see p.35).

701 Kinship and local affiliation together were the basic principles
by which subgroups of the raiding party seem to have been drawn up
during attack and on which leaders[2] within the party based their
rights to command specific combatants.

721 Retaliation was as important a motive for isoro as was indivi-
dual and group prestige. It was 'rare if not impossible' for
729 tribes to settle hostilities amicably by compensation, exchange
of hostages or other means (Williams 1930:166, 170 ff., 311 ff.).

721 Conquering groups operating from within their established
territorial frontiers seem seldom to have set out with the express
aim of acquiring new land for settlement or even to have used the
vacated land when they forced their enemies to withdraw.[3] Never-
theless, the Aiga people (mostly the Timbariundi, i.e., vanderers),
for instance, are known to have migrated to their present territory
by expelling another tribe and settling on their land.

The high value of the land on the volcanic slopes occupied by
the people called 'Periho' and 'Wasida' (by Plant and Williams,

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[1] 'Intertribal', 'interclan', etc., are terms which we apply to relationships between any - i.e., not necessarily all - representatives of the units in question.

[2] In the course of a raid, some of these leaders would assume the role of isoro ambo jigari, a man who should rally the slowest of his company in attack and protect the stragglers during withdrawal; the other class of leader was known as isoro kiti jigari, that is, a warrior who ordinarily directs raiding groups from in front and takes the initiative in tactical decisions. Kiti jigari is sometimes a term for leaders in ordinary village activities (kiti, the first, foremost; jigari, one who directs and controls an enterprise); cf. pp.51-3. See also Williams (W.23) who was told that in pre-contact times a renowned member of Sarahu clan would lead from behind in attacks by men of the Jegasi-Sarahu villages (of the 'Wasida' tribe).

[3] As the Sangara did to the Divinikovari, for instance (Williams O.12).

A. [See Category 721, p. 35--Analyst]

621 possession of its own tracts of land' (1928:125). In view of the
614 uncertainties regarding attributes which, we have noted, Williams associates with the 'clan', we can not readily say whether our discussion in the following sections confirms or contradicts this statement on land tenure.

614 Fighting within the tribe (emboge), though frequent,[1] was
578 governed by restrictive conventions absent from the conduct of deliberate raids (isoro). Organized aggression was rare and the
[721] deliberate destruction and homicide characteristic of the tribal raid were absent from the skirmishes which arose periodically in the course of ordinary interclan relationships. Disagreement over rights to land in the neighbourhood was one of a number of causes of interclan hostilities (see Williams 1930:107, 163). But we found no evidence from the area discussed in this report to indicate that land disputes between members of different clans
[721] involved the mobilization of their descent groups. Informants firmly denied that people would resort to attacking neighbours from another clan in order to acquire land.

[728] In presenting a picture of continuous feuding between local kin groups within the tribe, Keesing (1951:6) quotes Williams out of context: Williams (1930:311; and 160-7) was referring to the ineffectiveness of intertribal truces not to instability of peaceful relationships between these smaller groups when he says that no village lived in permanent security for fear of raids from its neighbours. The tribe lacked close political cohesion but relations between local groups within it do not seem to have been as precarious as Keesing describes. As Plant (1951: Appendix 3) indicates, a network of affiliations between descent groups in widely scattered areas formerly ensured generaly peaceful relations within the tribe.

614 The frequency with which fragments of one clan are found
701 scattered in 3 or more districts of the tribe suggests that here
[182] Langness' discussion of the Highlands (Watson, ed. 1964:174) may be relevant when he points to the probability of a causal connection between continuous violent warfare and the weakly patrilineal structure of groups,[2] in view of the fact that most warring groups needed continually to replace losses in numerical strength by recruiting outsiders; they would repeatedly scatter, regroup, take refuge or attach themselves permanently to stronger groups for

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[1] In fact, Williams (W.37) records that members of Jegase clan once fought some of the Sarahu, even though the names of the 2 clans were linked as the name of the political unit which he defined (see p.34).

[2] See sections c-f of this chapter.

241 of "dry" gardening, with fire and the digging stick as the essential tools, and either long term rotation of previously occupied areas or breaking in of new forest land. "The immediate family . . . is a self sufficient unit" and "the Orokaiva words for 'work' and 'garden' are one and the same." Con-
621 sistent with this mobile economic base, settlements are rarely more than hamlet size, with "hardly more than a dozen houses" on the average. Materials for housing are readily available, so that residence can be easily shifted.

The hamlet is based normally on patrilocal-patrilineal principles of organization, with a known strong tendency for new groups to form by "hiving off." Clan affiliations are
[614] reckoned from quite recent ancestors, so that at times a given clan may all be in one settlement, though more usually scattered through several closely related settlements. The
592 generally monogamous family units are under the "immediate
62 authority of the father," while the affairs of the local living
622 units are under loose supervision by the hamlet and clan elders, centered on a "men's house" and working together, usually with one strong senior man as "leader." Personal
422 property consists of mobile goods such as tools and utensils, clothing, and body ornaments.

181 In spite of ethnic similarities over a wide region, Williams speaks of the Orokaiva as being a "more than usually quarrelsome and disunited people"—a strong statement to make in the New Guinea setting. Their pre-pacification history was marked by "feuds, dispersals . . . a veritable whirlpool of strife, migration, and counter-migration." Beaver, too, refers to their "turbulent and restless life . . . migration was, in
[154] the main, a matter of attacking, fleeing, and pursuing." Supernatural weapons in the form of sorcery were especially feared. Even for Papuans, the Orokaiva proved to be unusually
[562] hostile and resistant to whites. Women were often seen ac-
[186] companying the war parties, carrying food and weapons, and sometimes joining in fights. Williams goes on to say that
[628] while the "elementary small sympathy-groups" (the local kin and settlement units, and to a lesser extent the dispersed clan units) were tightly knit, their external relations were
[778] precarious. "There were peacemakings or truces, but the truce was always a fragile one, and no (settlement) lived in permanent security." "Hiving off" occurred sometimes
361 as the result of a "quarrel and the fear of retaliatory magic,"
241 but more often it was "simply the lax method of horticulture
[518] which necessitates the clearing of many areas in succession and sometimes a temporary settlement on a distant site."
361 Another factor could have been food scarcities which tend
261 to occur in exceptionally dry southeast winter seasons. During this period, north and west Lamington area is in a rainshadow
731 zone, and people may have to scatter out to live on wild
165 roots and fruits. The implication of this is that even the excision of the 4,000 persons from the Orokaiva group who were killed involved no extensive shattering of valued ties.

361 Williams and others judge that with the modern pacifica-
178 tion, the Orokaiva have tended to disperse in even smaller living units than before. This appears to apply particularly
[199] to the relatively densely populated Lamington slopes, though a few instances of larger aggregations approaching a village
361 type also occurred, particularly as a result of Mission influ-
571 ence. Over against this greater dispersal, the people have;